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THE IMPACT OF LEGISLATIVE CHANGE ON 
ADJUDICATION PROVISIONS & THE REQUIREMENT 





The deletion of section 107 of Part II of the Housing, Grants and 
Construction Act 1996 will have a profound effect on the requirements for 
contracts in writing under the adjudication provisions of the new 
Construction Act 2009. This paper presents a reflection on the legal 
provisions and case law concerning the requirement for contracts in writing 
under the provision of the 1996 Act, against the backdrop of new rules 
encompassing oral and partly-oral agreements between parties. While the 
new provisions are unlikely to have an impact in cases where there are 
formal contracts which incorporate adjudication clauses, the changes are 
more likely to have an impact where there letters of intent are involved and 
where contracts in writing are based on standard terms and conditions 
supplemented by oral agreements. While the legislative changes may not have 
an impact on the role of the Adjudicator, it may affect their modus operandi, 
requiring more efforts to ascertain the precise intentions of the parties under 
dispute. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Amidst a flurry of cases during the early years of adjudication, the 
courts appear to have achieved their aim of resolving questions thrown up 
by the 1996 Housing Grants Construction and Regeneration Act (HGCRA)
 
and creating a reliable process for the pursuit of adjudication-related claims
1
. 
Increasingly, however, jurisdictional challenges have reduced the 
effectiveness of Adjudication and increased the cost of the process
2
. In 2010, 
a study by the Glasgow Caledonian University found that upwards of 25% 
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of challenges to the Adjudicators jurisdiction were related to whether the 
contract was in writing.
3
 
Against the backdrop of recent court decisions, it is clear that case law 
concerning the requirement for written agreements is still at an evolutionary 
stage. Given these developments it is timely to reflect upon case law 
concerning written agreements and in light of recent changes to adjudication 
legislation in the UK. 
I. THE NATURE OF THE ADJUDICATORS‘ DECISION 
The creation of the Scheme for Construction Contracts
 
and the Housing 
Grants Construction and Regeneration Act led to the development of the 
alternative methods of dispute resolution first proposed by in the Latham 
Report.
4
 Adjudication was introduced on a statutory basis under the Housing 
Grants Construction and Regeneration Act 1996. 
Adjudication in the construction industry is a process that provides for 
the referral of a dispute arising under contract at any time, to a person (an 
adjudicator) who has to act impartially on the basis of such information as 
the parties to the dispute are able to provide him, or he is able to ascertain 
for himself within a very limited timescale. He reaches conclusions as to the 
parties‘ rights and obligations under their contract on the basis of the 
information provided by the parties. The decision being set out is 
contractually binding on the parties until the original decision is finally 
determined in legal proceedings or by arbitration (if the contract so provides 
for between the parties) or by agreement between the parties. Adjudication 
is therefore not final and not binding. The dispute is not settled by 
adjudication, although it may be if the parties choose to accept the 
adjudicator‘s decision as final.  Once the adjudicator has made his decision 
on the rights of the parties under contract, it is for the parties to decide 
whether they agree with those conclusions, or have the dispute heard again 
by a tribunal that will give them a decision that is final and binding. The 
parties are quite at liberty not to accept the adjudicator‘s decision, although 
they are bound by the decision, temporarily at least. 
Adjudication by itself does not and cannot resolve the dispute. For the 
dispute to be resolved each party has to decide for itself that it will not take 
the matter further. An adjudicator states what his conclusions are as to the 
rights and obligations of the parties. This decision may be based upon very 
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limited information. It certainly will have to be made in a limited time. Both 
these factors may well mean that the adjudicator‘s decision leaves a lot to be 
desired. The adjudicator may certainly not have sufficient time to make a 
full, forensic investigation. It may be that the adjudicator considers the 
dispute is of such a nature that it is totally impossible for him to reach any 




Examples abound where parties have argued that all or part of the 
contract is not ‗in writing‘ to avoid any liability. The courts have considered 
this aspect on a number of occasions under the provisions of the 1996 Act 
and held that no contract exists where the agreement is too ambiguous to 
constitute a contract. What constitutes a contract in writing is an interesting 
question and fundamental to adjudication under HGCRA, but who decides if 
a contract is in writing? Does the adjudicator have the power to decide?  If 
no contract exists, then it follows that the Adjudicator has no jurisdiction 
under the law. However, Adjudicators do not have power to decide on their 
own jurisdiction. Many adjudicators faced this challenge and either decided 
to resign or continue with proceedings. Typically, the decision was an 
objective one, taking into account factors such the price and scope of works, 
as well as start and completion dates.
6
 
II. ORAL AND WRITTEN AGREEMENTS: THE PROVISIONS OF THE HGCRA 
The HGCRA required construction contracts to be in writing. Whilst 
oral agreements were binding on the parties, the difficulty arose in 
determining the precise terms of that agreement in the absence of clear 
written evidence. It is for this reason that section 107 of the Act only applied 
to written contracts.  Thus, unless the construction contract was an 
‗agreement in writing‘ there was no right to adjudicate under the 1996 Act. 
This meant that oral contracts were not subject to adjudication under 
HGCRA, unlike the new state of affairs created under the provisions of the 
Construction 2009 Act. There was a complicated definition of what is meant 
by the term agreement ‗in writing‘. Section 107(1)-(6) of the HGCRA 1996 
stated: 
(1) The provisions of this Part apply only where the construction contract is 
in writing, and any other agreement between the parties as to any matter is 
effective for the purposes of this Part only if in writing. 
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The expressions ―agreement‖, ―agree‖ and ―agreed‖ shall be construed 
accordingly. 
(2) There is an agreement in writing— 
(a) if the agreement is made in writing (whether or not it is signed by the 
parties), 
(b) if the agreement is made by exchange of communications in writing, or 
(c) if the agreement is evidenced in writing. 
(3) Where parties agree otherwise than in writing by reference to terms which 
are in writing, they make an agreement in writing. 
(4) An agreement is evidenced in writing if an agreement made otherwise 
than in writing is recorded by one of the parties, or by a third party, with the 
authority of the parties to the agreement. 
(5) An exchange of written submissions in adjudication proceedings, or in 
arbitral or legal proceedings in which the existence of an agreement otherwise 
than in writing is alleged by one party against another party and not denied by the 
other party in his response constitutes as between those parties an agreement in 
writing to the effect alleged. 
(6) References in this Part to anything being written or in writing include its 
being recorded by any mean. 
In circumstances where a contract was not be covered by section 107, 
Atkinson (2002)
7
 suggested that that courts had taken ‗a robust approach to 
the interpretation of section 107, straining its meaning … so that parties 
without a contract can benefit from adjudication’. 
In A&D Maintenance & Construction Ltd v Pagehurst Construction 
Service Ltd,
8
 the court confirmed that, although there was no written 
contract, both parties proceeded as if there was one and neither party denied 
a contract was in place, thus an agreement in writing existed. If either party 
had denied their intention to create a written contract, then an adjudicator 
would have had no jurisdiction under the provisions of the 1996 Act. In 
Grovedeck Ltd v Capital Demolition Ltd,
9
 Grovedeck sought to enforce the 
adjudicator‘s decision. In the enforcement proceedings, Grovedeck 
abandoned the post-dispute correspondence as evidence of the contract in 
writing and adopted the argument based on Section 107(5). HHJ Bowsher 
was unable to accept that: 
The contracts were not subject to any terms about adjudication when the 
Adjudicator was appointed and so, at the date of his appointment, he had no 
jurisdiction. Did something happen later to change the nature of the contracts 
between the parties and give jurisdiction to the adjudicator so as to bestow validity 
on what was proceeding as an invalid adjudication? The claimants say, Yes. The 
claimants‘ submissions involve this unstated proposition that even though in every 
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communication after his unlawful appointment the defendants challenged and 
denied the jurisdiction of the adjudicator, those same communications themselves 
changed the nature of the parties‘ contracts and gave him jurisdiction. Freedom of 
contract has fallen, but I cannot believe that it has fallen that far 
The 'in writing' requirement was applied wholesale to the entire 
substantive agreement, as endorsed by the Court of Appeal decision in RJT 
Consulting Engineers v DM Engineering (Northern Ireland) Ltd (2002).
10
 
RJT Consulting Engineers Ltd was the third decision of the Court of Appeal 
in respect of adjudication. 
In RJT Consulting Engineers, the Technology and Construction Court 
held that the documentary evidence and written material between the two 
parties was sufficient to bring their agreement within the adjudication 
proceedings. Accordingly the declaration sought by RJT that the agreement 
was not an agreement in writing for the Act was refused. The matter then 
came before the Court of Appeal, which overturned the decision of the TCC. 
RJT argued that there had been confusion regarding documents consistent 
with there being a contract and documents, which constituted a record of the 
entirety of the oral agreement. RJT maintained that the whole agreement 
had to be evidenced in writing in order to provide the certainty, which 
would enable the adjudicator to move swiftly to a decision within the short 
timetable provided by the 1996 Act. 
DM countered that all that was necessary was that there should be 
evidence in writing of the existence of a contract in writing, whether that 
would be the identities of the parties, and the price and nature of the works 
to be undertaken. The Court of Appeal agreed with RJT.  The invoices and 
other extensive evidence relied on by DM was simply evidence of the 
existence of contract. It was not evidence of the terms of the oral agreement 
between the parties. Section 107 of the Act details what has to be evidenced 
in writing is literally the agreement, which means all of it, not just part of it. 
The only exception to that generally is where relevant parts of an oral 
agreement are alleged and not denied in written submissions in adjudication. 
The appeal was allowed however it was noted that what is more important is 
that the terms of the agreement is material to the issues giving rise to the 
adjudication are clearly recorded in writing. Written evidence of all the 
material terms would therefore suffice.  The material terms of the agreement 
must be recorded in any one of the forms prescribed by section 107 of the 
Act for the requirements of that section to be met and for the agreement to 
constitute a ‗construction contract‘. 
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For a claimant to seek to say that a contract is evidenced in writing 
pursuant to section 107 (4) of the Act, they must show that the written 
documentation evidenced the whole of the agreement and not just part of the 
agreement, as was the case in Debeck Ductwork Installation Ltd v T&E 
Engineering Ltd.
11
 However, in Cowlin Construction Limited v CFW 
Architects (2002),
12
 only a little over a month later, HHJ Kirkham held that: 
It appears that the contract was made partially in writing and partly oral….It 
is clearly evidenced in writing. Pursuant to section 107(2) of HGCRA, this was a 
construction contract. 
Whereas, in Carillion Construction Limited v Devonport Royal 
Dockyard (2002),
13
 HHJ Bowsher held that if a variation to the terms of a 
contract is agreed orally, this must be recorded or evidenced in writing, 
failing which an adjudicator will not have jurisdiction to decide disputes 
arising under the oral agreement. While some suggest that the debate 
surrounding the requirement to satisfy section 107 has largely been 
resolved,
14
 some controversy remained. In RJT, the Court of Appeal decided 
that the whole of the terms of the agreement (not just the fact of an 
agreement) must be evidenced in writing, but scope to depart from the ‗RJT‘ 
principle does exist in particular circumstances. In Connex South Eastern 
Ltd v MJ Building Services Group Ltd (2004),
15
 for example, the court held 
that there was no oral aspect to the underlying contract (i.e. the meeting 
minutes confirmed that Connex accepted M J Building‘s tender in its 
entirety) and therefore the Act did apply, whereas in the RJT Court of 
Appeal case it was found that part of the underlying contract was oral, and, 
as that part of the oral contract had not been evidenced in writing, the Act 
did not apply. 
In light of the foregoing, it seems that the process of deciding what was 
considered ‗evidenced in writing‘ and what was not was fraught with 
difficulty. The apparently restrictive interpretation of section 107 of the Act 
by the Court of Appeal in RJT remained of real concern within the industry, 
particularly among smaller firms who fell outside the provisions of the 1996 
Act. Concern within the industry was expressed as early as 2004 in a report 
by the Construction Umbrella Bodies.
16
 The report recommended that in 
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respect of ‗evidenced in writing‘, the law should be clarified particularly in 
light of the RJT case, to avoid undermining the adjudication process 
altogether if left unresolved. A number of authors have considered the 
decision in RJT unfortunate and suggested that it would create, or the 
potential to create, major problems.
17
 Critics suggested that it would open 
the door to a ‗flood of jurisdictional challenges‘. There are many written 
agreements between the parties to a construction contract that do not 
incorporate, necessarily or ‗literally‘, every term which has been agreed.  
Indeed, some important matters are left to oral agreement, for example, the 
day on which the works are to commence.
18
 There may also be many minor 
immaterial matters which have been agreed which are not recorded in 
writing.  If the majority view in RJT was taken ‗literally‘, the construction 
contract would not be in writing or, at least, as fully in writing as their 
judgments had suggested is required. However, the House of Lords refused 
a petition to appeal. Certainly, the RJT decision considerably limited the 
right to adjudicate where no written contract agreement exists, but the 
decision was reached not because the court wished to restrict the right to 
adjudicate, but as LJ Ward foresaw, the difficulty an adjudicator would have 
making a decision based on an alleged oral agreement within the tight 
timeframe provided by the process.
19
 Indeed, as LJ Ward stated: 
Certainty is all the more important when adjudication is envisaged to take 
place under a demanding timetable. The adjudicator has to start with some 
certainty as to what the terms of the contract are 
Nevertheless, there is still controversy about the effect of section 107 
as construed by the decision in RJT. In the early 2000s, some within the 
construction industry called for the abolition of the requirement so that all 
construction contracts even those which are oral or partly in writing are 
covered by the Act
20
 (akin to legislation in New South Wales); others 
preferred the status quo.
21
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III. CONTRACTS IN WRITING: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
A closer examination of the precise terminology of the 1996 Act is 
fundamental to our understanding of the law concerning contracts in writing 
and the nature of what constitutes a contract under HGCRA. The 1996 Act 
used wording such as ‗by reference to terms that are in writing‘. There is no 
reference to a ‗previous agreement that is in writing‘. Indeed, there is no 
provision for adjudication in relation to an alleged construction contract 
made orally or otherwise not evidenced in writing – (see case under footnote 
13). This would seem to be contrary to the provisions of section 107 (1) of 
the 1996 Act. What constitutes a construction contract? What is the basis of 
the agreement? There must obviously be agreement on scope, price and time. 
On the contrary, what if there was no agreement over time? Certainly, there 
would be an implied term within the contract that the works will be 
completed within a ‗reasonable time‘, but does this provide us with certainty 
that a contract exists where the scope and price are more precise? What if 
the contract alluded to reasonable costs incurred? What if the identity of the 
parties was uncertain? What if the scope of works was based on subsequent 
instruction or orders, which may or not be set down in writing? In such 
circumstances is there any guidance we can draw upon as to what 
constitutes a construction contract? Section 107 of the Act only applies 
where there is a contract in writing, meaning that all material terms must be 
in writing; see RJT as the leading authority in the area. Justice Jackson has 
also provided additional guidance on the constitution of a construction 
contract more recently in the case of Mast Electrical v Kendall (2007).
22
 
Justice Jackson noted that a thorough analysis of correspondence, meeting 
minutes and so on was warranted to establish whether a contract was ever 
concluded between parties.  He also noted that where there had been 
performance ‗the court would lean in favour of finding a contract if it could 
probably do so’. What if there was no agreement on all the material terms 
between the parties? Under RJT principles there would be no contract, but 
the contractor may be entitled to a quantum meruit under contract law 
provisions. In all circumstances, courts would be obliged to follow the 
principles established within RJT. In other words, as Brawn (2010, pg 37)
23
 
has noted, either: 
The contract must be in writing; 
Established by means of communication in writing; 
                                                          
22 Mast Electrical Services v Kendall Cross Holdings Limited {2007] EWHC 1296 (TCC). 
23 Brawn, D (2010) The circumstances in which an adjudicators decision is unenforceable or 
inappropriate in construction disputes, International journal of arbitration, mediation and dispute 
management, volume 76, Number 3, August. 
  
Evidenced in writing; 
Agreed by reference to terms in writing; or 
Exchange of submissions in proceedings in which the existence of contract is 
alleged by one party and not denied by the other party. 
The decision of the court in Hart Investments Limited v Fidler (2006)
24
 
provides a further example of an authority in this area.   In terms of the role 
of the Adjudicator, they would need to adopt a rigorous approach in 
determining whether minor issues said to have been agreed orally between 
parties prevent an otherwise written contract pursuant to section 107 of the 
Act being considered as a contract in writing. 
The exercise itself must be objective and take into account the nature 
of the contract and the parties themselves. Nevertheless, what may be a 
minor issue in one contract may not be minor in another one. In for example, 
a 10 million pound project an oral agreement on different types of 
architectural ironmongery may be a minor issue but a major one on another 
development. The adjudicator would also need to consider the intention of 
the parties, and whether they intend to give affect to their oral agreement 
such that it becomes binding in written form at later stage. On the other 
hand, a later oral agreement may not be binding on parties because it lacks 
consideration or because it was not intended to be binding, as in the case of 
Allen Wilson Joinery Ltd v Privetgrange Construction Ltd [2008].
25
 There 
remains a great deal of legal uncertainty about the effect of subsequent oral 
amendments to written contracts or oral variations to the scope of works, to 
the extent that differences of opinion have emerged among legal 
practitioners. While some consider that the right to adjudicate was lost 
under the 1996 Act, others considered the right to adjudicate unaffected, 
particularly with respect to oral amendments to the works. The debate has 
provided a fertile ground for challenges to the Adjudicator‘s jurisdiction 
under the 1996 Act. Indeed, what if the written terms of the contract were 
incomplete or further terms agreed orally, or significant changes to the 
scope of works agreed on an oral basis? Is there any guidance we can draw 
upon in such circumstances? The answer to this question is yes. For instance, 
in Hatmet v Herbert (2005),
26
 there was sufficient written evidence as to the 
scope of the work, price and timeframe, but little information on the basis of 
price revision. In these circumstances the provisions of section 15 of the 
Sale of Goods Act (1992) such that an implied term would apply that would 
require a reasonable price be paid for any price revision. In Carillion 
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Construction Ltd v Devonport Royal Dockyard Ltd (2005)
27
 a written 
contract was varied mid-way into the works by an oral agreement. This 
changed the basis of the payment to a cost-reimbursable one. The court held 
that the adjudicator had no jurisdiction to decide whether an oral agreement 
varied the written one. The adjudication was deemed invalid by the court 
under the prescriptions of the 1996 Act. Letters of intent are a common 
feature of the contract-forming process in the construction industry, but do 
they have any currency under the provisions of section 107 of the Act? The 
answer to this question is no.  Where the works are undertaken under a letter 
of intent it will be difficult, but not impossible, to demonstrate that an 
agreement in writing exists as prescribed under section 107. This is because 
by the time a dispute has arisen further agreements have usually been made 
that are either inferred from conduct, where they agreed orally, or not 
evidenced by the letter of intent. 
It is also common for parties to rely on particular documents as 
evidence that a contract exists during adjudication, but are there any legal 
implications under the provisions of the 1996 Act?  The answer to this 
question is yes. Where a party, relies upon a particular document as 
evidence of a contract when adjudicating, it will be bound by the terms 
within that document.  Subsequently, if evidence emerged under the old 
rules that there are other terms not recorded in that document, even if they 
are recorded in other documents, then if the adjudicator takes those other 
documents into account in his decision, that decision is unlikely to be 
enforced by the courts. In for example, Redworth Construction v Brook dale 
Healthcare (2006)
28
 the court concluded that while the ‗contract‘ referred to 
adjudication, it did not meet the RJT test of an agreement in writing as 
prescribed under section 107. In terms of agreements as to the scope of 
works and subsequent oral variations, there are three noteworthy cases.  In 
Deback v T&E Engineering (2002),
29
 the contract between the parties was 
not adequately evidenced in writing because the fax relied upon by the 
plaintiff did not sufficiently establish the scope of works.    In Management 
Solutions Professional Consultants Limited v Bennett (Electrical) Services 
Limited (2006)
30
 and ALE Heavylift v MSD (Darlington) Limited (2006),
31
 
the parties waived the need for instructions to vary the scope of works to be 
confirmed in writing. The argument upheld by the courts was that the 
absence of confirmation in writing did not take the contract outside the 
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scope of section 107 of the 1996 Act. The principle being that where a 
written contract provides that instructions allowing variations to the scope 
of works are permissible if confirmed in writing, a contract in writing still 
exists even if the instruction given under the authority of the contract is not 
confirmed in writing. 
What about the inclusion of implied terms in a construction contract? 
Does this transform an otherwise written contract into one that is no longer 
written under the provisions of section 107 of the 1996 Act? The answer to 
this question is no. According to Royce (2009) ‗it was manifestly not the 
intention of parliament to exclude from the jurisdiction of an adjudicator an 
agreement solely because it contains implied terms’, as endorsed by the 
court in Connex South Eastern Ltd
32
 and more latterly Allen Wilson v 
Privetgrange Construction (2008).
33
 Rather, Parliament‘s intentions were to 
avoid a situation whereby one or other party would suggest that a contract, 
otherwise not complete under the provisions of section 107, could be 
completed after execution by virtue of implied terms representing the 
‗unexpressed intention‘ of either party, as noted in Galliford Try 
Construction Ltd v Michael Heal Associates Ltd (2003).
34
 We know that 
implied terms operate by virtue of the law. Such terms are implied into 
contracts for different reasons. Whereas, some terms are implied into 
contracts to give effect [for example, business efficacy] to a contract, other 
terms are implied to provide context to an actual relationship between 
parties. Should we differentiate between different types of implied terms 
within the context of section 107? 
The answer to this question is no, according to Royce (2009).
35
 Thus, 
there is no reason why any type of implied terms transform an otherwise 
written contract into one not covered by the provisions of the 1996 Act; see 
for example, Allen Wilson v Privetgrange Construction (2008),
36
 as an 
example of an authority in this area. The remaining provisions of Section 
107 merit also closer scrutiny. This is because they provide other means by 




Section 107 (4) states: 
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35 Royce, D (2009) Adjudication: Recent Development, http://construction.practicallaw.com/6-204-
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An agreement is evidenced in writing if an agreement made otherwise than in 
writing is recorded by one of the parties, or by a third party, with the authority of 
the parties to the agreement. 
Section 107 (5) states: 
An exchange of written submissions in adjudication proceedings, or in 
arbitral or legal proceedings in which the existence of an agreement otherwise 
than in writing is alleged by one party against another party and not denied by the 
other party in his response constitutes as between those parties an agreement in 
writing to the effect alleged. 
The wording of Section 107 (5) is controversial and worthy of closer 
examination.  The wording seems to suggest that if one party to adjudication 
alleges the existence of an oral agreement under their terms, and the other 
party does not deny the agreement on this basis, then there will be an 
agreement in writing. Thus, in spite of the ruling in RJT it does seem 
possible to create a written agreement from an oral agreement which is oral 
or partly oral if the agreement is asserted in written submissions in an 
adjudication, arbitration or legal proceedings where the other party does not 
deny that agreement. It is difficult to believe that Parliament‘s intention was 
to create something so manifestly unjust. Is there any guidance we can draw 
upon? The answer to this question is yes. In, for example, Grovedeck v 
Demolition (2000),
38
 the court held that section 107(5) had a narrow focus. 
In other words, it only applied where an oral agreement has been admitted 
in a previous adjudication, but most responding parties would raise an RJT  
jurisdictional challenge on the basis of section 107 in that first adjudication. 
Thus, a party who does not raise the challenge initially would lose the right 
to challenge on those grounds in subsequent adjudications.    However, is it 
also worth examining the precise wording of section 107 (5) against the 
backdrop of parliamentary intentions and deliberations at this point.   An 
examination of the proceedings of the House of Lords for 23
rd
 July 1996 on 
the wording of section 107(5) reveals no mention of ‗adjudication 
proceedings‘. 
It seems that the upper chamber of Parliament incorporated an 
amendment proposed by the House of Commons, in which the words ‗in 
adjudication proceedings or‘ would immediately follow the word 
‗submission‘. According to Royce (2009)39 Parliament‘s intention was to 
make reference to to ‗other, prior’ adjudication proceedings, not to provide 
an adjudicator with jurisdiction over proceedings for which he did not have 
at appointment based upon submissions made by one party to otherwise 
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unauthorised adjudication. We know that amendments to the Act will repeal 
Section 107 of the 1996 Act in its entirety. This will mean that adjudication 
provisions will apply to all construction contracts whether written or oral, or 
even partly in writing and partly oral. However, the new Act will also 
amend section 108(2) whereby all the provisions setting out the required 
adjudication procedures will have to be in writing.  If they are not in writing 
the Scheme for Construction Contracts will apply. There have been two 
recent cases that have caused some confusion among practitioners in 
relation to contracts in writing. In T & T Fabrications v Hubbard (2008),
40
 
the decision of an adjudicator was not enforced on the basis that certain 
terms of the contract relating to the provision of drawings and the timing of 
the works were not in writing. 
The terms went to the scope, quality and essential of the works and 
there was a genuine dispute as to whether these terms had been agreed. 
Therefore, there was an arguable case that the terms of the contract were not 
in writing. However in the second case, Allen Wilson Joinery v 
Privetgrange Construction Limited (2008)
41
 it was held, firstly, that implied 
terms do not prevent a contract from being in writing and, secondly, that a 
budget price with a final price to be agreed does not prevent there being a 
contract in writing. In sum, the HGCRA required contract to be in writing 
(or at least those evidenced in writing), if the adjudicator‘s decision was not 
to be challenged on jurisdictional grounds. There have a large numbers of 
challenges where the contract was not in writing or not evidenced in writing 
under the UK regime, but much fewer incidences and disputes elsewhere. In 
New Zealand, for example, Construction Contracts Bill (CCB) not only 
provides for written contract, but also to oral or partly written and partly 
oral contract.
42
 The BCISP Act in Singapore and NSW (Section 7(1)) too 
define a ―contract in writing‖ in relatively wider terms, to the extent that it 
would extent to a loose collection of documents, exchanges and invoices.
43
 
This suggests that the proposed amendments to HGCRA may not be as 
problematic as some commentators anticipate. The removal of section 107 
of the 1996 Act, and so the requirement for a construction contract to be in 
written form, may render the RJT principles and subsequent legal 
judgements ineffectual, however, it is important to note that, until the 
amendments to the Act come into force, the case law remains effective. 
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IV. THE CONSTRUCTION ACT 2009: IMPLICATIONS OF IMPEDING CHANGE TO 
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR CONTRACTS IN WRITING 
The Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act – 
the Construction Act 2009 -received Royal Assent in July 2009 (Brawn, 
2010), and came into force on 1
st
 October 2011 (in England and Wales). The 
new legislation amends Part II of the Housing Grants, Construction and 
Regeneration Act 1996. The main benefits of the new Act, as conceived by 
the Government, was to improve cash flow in the construction supply chains 
and encourage parties to resolve disputes by adjudication rather than by 
arbitration or litigation (Gwilliam, 2010). The main changes effected by the 
new Act are: 
Adjudicators will no longer be limited to contracts in writing; 
Adjudicators will be able to correct their decision if a clerical or 
typographical error is made; and 
Parties will not be able to agree a term which provides for who is to bear that 
costs of an adjudication until after the adjudicator has been appointed. 
The most significant change is the abolition of the requirement for 
contracts in writing. The amendment will apply across the new Act and 
cover the payment provisions. This will mean that even purely oral 
agreements will now have to incorporate the payment provisions and the 
need for notices.
44
 Nevertheless, some claim that the deletion of the 
requirement for contracts to be in writing will create greater uncertainty for 
the adjudication process, leading to a greater potential for injustice. 
Agreement on material terms, however trivial, is undeniable and for 
adjudication to be available these have to be in writing. This level of 
certainty provides the adjudicator with a greater sense of parties‘ intentions 
and nature a contract.However, there is a perception that HGCRA 
mechanisms were open to abuse, particularly by those with the greater 
bargaining power within the industry.
45
 The new legislation may not only 
provide smaller contractors, often less adept at dealing with contractual 
matters with greater protection against abusive practices, but also greater 
access to the adjudication process itself: many verbal contracts or written 
agreements involving oral variations typically involve smaller, more 
financially vulnerable sub-contracting firms. 
CONCLUSION 
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The HGCR Act (s107) required contracts to be in writing (or at least 
evidenced in writing), to preclude challenges to adjudicator‘s decisions on 
jurisdictional grounds. Cases such as Grovedeck Ltd v Capital Demolition 
Ltd [2000]; RJT Consulting Engineers Ltd v DM Engineering (NI) Ltd 
[2002]; and Carillion Construction Ltd v Devonport Royal Dockyard Ltd 
[2003]; Allen Wilson Joinery v Privetgrange Construction Limited [2008] 
have demonstrated the position of courts pursuant to section 107 of the 1996 
Act.  It will be interesting to see how the amendments to Section 107 of the 
1996 Act will operate in practice.  We can only speculate on the likely 
impact on industry at this time.  While the new provisions are unlikely to 
have an impact in cases where there are formal contracts which incorporate 
adjudication clauses, the changes are more likely to have an impact where 
there letters of intent are involved and where written contracts are based on 
standard terms and conditions supplemented by verbal agreements. While 
the legislative changes may not have an impact on the role of the 
Adjudicator, it will affect their modus operandi.  The adjudicator will need 
to find additional time to consider the formation of the verbal contract to 
ascertain the precise intentions of the parties. Inevitably, where oral 
agreements are concerned, adjudicators will also need to consult witnesses 
and where differing views exist there will be need to probe witness 
statements through some form of cross-examination process. This is likely 
to be highly contentious, potentially giving rise to grievances, injustice and 
challenges to adjudicator‘s decisions. 
